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A new treaty has emerged to address the most ubiquitous 
means of violence that the world has ever known. In the Arms 
Trade Treaty (“ATT”),1 humanity has taken an important stride, 
treating conventional arms2 as a central topic of global weapons 
control which has heretofore focused predominantly on 
weapons of mass destruction.3 The ATT’s goal is to contribute to 
                                                                                                                                     
1. Final United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, Mar. 18–28, 2013, 
Draft Decision, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.217/2013/L.3 (Apr. 2, 2013) [hereinafter ATT] 
(the Arms Trade Treaty’s text is annexed to the draft decision). The Arms Trade Treaty 
(“ATT”), while approved by the UN General Assembly, has not yet entered into force. 
See Signature and Ratification, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/disarmament/
ATT/docs/ATT_info_kit.pdf, 3 (last visited March 21, 2014) [hereinafter Signature & 
Ratification]; The Arms Trade Treaty, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/
disarmament/ATT (last visited March 21, 2014) (stating that thirteen states have 
currently ratified the treaty). 
2. Throughout this Article, the term conventional arms refers to all and only the 
weapons included in the Arms Trade Treaty (“ATT”) scope. Article 2 identifies eight 
categories of conventional arms: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large-caliber 
artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles and missile 
launchers, and small arms and light weapons. ATT, supra note 1, art. 2. The final 
category, small arms and light weapons, itself comprises a broad and not-altogether-
explicitly-defined group of weapons. ATT Article 3 brings within the ATT’s scope 
ammunition/munitions fired, launched, or delivered by conventional arms, and Article 
4 applies the ATT’s provisions to parts and components that provide the capability to 
assemble conventional arms. Id. arts. 3–4. For a discussion of the ATT’s scope, see 
generally HILDE WALLACHER & ALEXANDER HARANG, PEACE RESEARCH INST. OSLO, 
SMALL, BUT LETHAL—SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION AND THE ARMS TRADE (2011), available 
at http://controlarms.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Small-but-Lethal-
Small-Arms-Ammunition-and-the-Arms-Trade-Treaty.PRIO_.pdf. Notably, earlier treaty 
text included in the list of conventional arms “Technology and Equipment specially 
and exclusively designed and used to develop, manufacture, or maintain.” See 
Chairman’s Draft Paper, CONTROLARMS.ORG § IV(1)(l) (July 14, 2011), 
http://controlarms.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/ChairPaper-
14July2011.pdf. This provision, however, did not survive to the final text. 
3 . To be fair, arms control has had some notable successes in controlling 
conventional weapons among the world’s powers and can be credited with de-
escalation of violence between superpower States including the Treaty on Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe, Nov. 19, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 1149, and the Convention on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may 
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international peace and security by establishing high common 
international standards for regulating the conventional arms 
trade and by preventing and eradicating the illicit trade in 
conventional arms. Exports of arms in violation of UN Security 
Council arms embargoes or multilateral conventions are 
prohibited, and no State may transfer arms for use in the 
commission of grave international crimes. States must regulate 
arms brokering and must assess the risk that conventional arms 
exports will contribute to the commission of human rights 
violations. Moreover, the ATT encourages international 
cooperation and assistance to effectively implement and enforce 
its provisions. 
Arguments should and will be made, some in this Article, 
about the limitations of the ATT’s many provisions. Yet, the 
important point is that the ATT weds principles of international 
arms control with bedrock international legal commitments to 
protect human rights and diminish violence. 
In the history of violence, conventional arms have taken 
more lives than all the nuclear, chemical, and biological 
weapons (“NCB weapons”) combined with all the swords and 
spears of earlier eras. Yet in the history of international law, the 
control of conventional arms has been among the greatest 
shortcomings. Since explosive weapons (cannon and firearms) 
emerged in the 16th Century, bringing quantum leaps in 
violence,4 various legal modalities for curbing violence have 
matured: improving conflict resolution, addressing poverty and 
hunger, and establishing post-conflict justice. Yet, mass violence 
endures. Virtually all mass violence in recent memory has 
entailed conventional arms, and the vast majority of the victims 
of conventional arms-fueled violence are civilians.5 
Large quantities of conventional arms residual from the 
Cold War and inflated by manufacturers hungry for sales have 
                                                                                                                                     
be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 
1342 U.N.T.S. 137. 
4 . See Barry Kellman, Of Guns and Grotius, 7 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 
(forthcoming  2014). 
5 . See Ramadansyah Hasan, Controlling the Circulation of Small Arms in 
International Law 3 (2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Waikato), 
available at http://researchcommons.waikato.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/10289/7500/
thesis.pdf?sequence=3. 
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sustained a flourishing market.6 Unconstrained by ideology or 
bipolar strategic constraints and enabled by modern global 
delivery networks, conventional arms go wherever violence 
demands. Indeed, the world is awash in conventional arms, with 
devastating ramifications for economic and cultural 
development, community stability, public health, and human 
progress.7 
On the other hand, conventional arms are also the essential 
tool of defense, whether national or individual. In a world where 
violent people have ready access to conventional weapons, 
peaceful people should not suffer and die simply for lack of 
access to comparable weapons.8 Moreover, these weapons, in the 
hands of law enforcers, are the foundation of community 
security. Arguably, transfers of conventional arms can contribute 
to the recipient’s explicitly protected right of self-defense as well 
as to civil stability by enabling authorized law enforcers to 
apprehend and prosecute criminals. 
A repeated theme of this Article is that conventional arms 
control cannot, at least at this time, aspire to total and complete 
disarmament.  In this sense, the challenge of conventional arms 
control is very different from NCB weapons control.9 For the 
foreseeable future, many people are committed to having well-
armed, legally authorized forces that are capable of inflicting 
                                                                                                                                     
6. See Harold Hongju Koh, A World Drowning in Guns, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2333, 
2343 (2003); see also Hasan, supra note 5, at 4–6. 
7. See generally Lisa Misol, Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World 
Report 2004—Weapons and War Crimes: The Complicity of Arms Suppliers 3 (January 
2004), available at http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/402ba58b4.pdf; Annyssa Bellal, Arms 
Transfers and International Human Rights Law, in WEAPONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 448, 470–71 (Stuart Casey-Maslen ed., 2013); Aluko Ola, Trans-
Border Communities Planning and the Problem of Arms Smuggling in the West African Sub-
Region: The Case Study of Nigeria-Benin Border Development, 2 INT’L J. ASIAN SOC. SCI. 71, 
71 (2012); C.J. Chivers, Small Arms, Big Problems—The Fallout of the Global Gun Trade, 90 
FOREIGN AFF. 110, 117 (2011); Muhammad Munir, The Role of Light Weapons in Creating 
Internal Instability: Case Study of Pakistan, 18 J. POL. STUD. 243, 243–44 (2011). 
8. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 55/255, para. 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/255 (May 31, 2001) 
(expressing concern that a regulation on firearms could undermine a State’s right to 
self-defense and reaffirms the right of individual or collective self-defense “which 
implies that States also have the right to acquire arms with which to defend 
themselves”); see also David B. Kopel et al., Is Resisting Genocide a Human Right?, 81 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275, 1275 (2006). 
9. See generally Bryan Cenko, Five Ways the Arms Trade Treaty Advances Arms Control, 
FOREIGN POL’Y FOCUS (June 4, 2013), http://fpif.org/five_ways_the_arms_trade_
treaty_advances_arms_control. 
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lethal force in order to preserve peace. For some people, 
conventional weapons should be accessible to those who would 
resist legally authorized forces of oppression.10 In any event, 
conventional arms disarmament is not a viable policy objective. 
The ATT thus treads nuanced territory that seeks to stanch the 
illegal trade in conventional arms while leaving space for the 
legal trade in conventional arms to operate.11 
The success of the ATT, which as of this writing has not yet 
entered into force, remains to be measured. Key determinants 
of that success are more in the domain of politics than law.12 
How quickly it enters into force, how active is its Conference of 
States Parties, and how effectively can its Secretariat enable 
national implementation that can actually stanch the flow of 
conventional arms—these are key questions that await answers 
from world leaders.13 Ultimately, the ATT’s policy success will be 
                                                                                                                                     
10. The 2006 review conference for the UN Programme of Action (“UNPoA”), 
discussed infra, is noted by experts as a historical marker for international arguments 
concerning the right to bear arms, of just war concepts, and of moral obligations to 
help people overthrow repression. See, e.g., Hasan, supra note 5, at 193. 
11. See Donald Mahley, U.S. Representative to the Arms Trade Treaty Conference, 
U.S. Dep’t of State, Opening Statement at the UN Conference on the Arms Trade 
Treaty (July 12, 2012), available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/194955.htm 
(“Lawfully conducted international transfers of arms managed according to 
transparent national control practices are vital to maintaining good governance, 
protecting citizens, and upholding international security consistent with the United 
Nations Charter.”). 
12. Final Conference President, Peter Woolcott, reiterated that “[t]he final text 
was a compromise. It represented the broadest possible input and would make a 
difference to the broadest range of stakeholders, notably by setting up a forum—the 
conference of States parties—for transparency and accountability.” Press Release, 
General Assembly, Overwhelming Majority of States in General Assembly Say ‘Yes’ to 
Arms Trade Treaty to Stave off Irresponsible Transfers that Perpetuate Conflict, 
Human Suffering, UN Press Release GA/11354 (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.un.org/
News/Press/docs/2013/ga11354.doc.htm. 
13. It is worth noting that the United States has long been a global leader in 
efforts to mitigate the illicit trafficking and destabilizing accumulation of small arms 
and light weapons (“SALW”) through diplomacy and foreign assistance. See generally 
Rachel Stohl, U.S. Policy and the Arms Trade Treaty 20–22 (Chatham House—Project 
Ploughshares, Working Paper No. 10-1, 2010), available at http://ploughshares.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2012/08/WP10.1.pdf (noting that the United States is a State Party 
of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (1981) and CCW Protocols I–V; 
has participated in the UN Register every year since its inception (1992); actively 
implements the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons; 
complies with and assists others’ compliance as to the UN International Tracing 
Instrument; is a participating State in the Wassenaar Arrangement Best Practice 
Guidelines on SALW and on MANPADS; is a signatory of the Inter-American 
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measured by how much it enables more resources and attention 
to be focused on helping law enforcers reduce the flow and thus 
the use of illicit conventional arms. From this writer’s 
perspective, the political desirability of the ATT’s ratification by 
humanity’s leading powers seems obvious but is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
Compounding the difficulties of predicting the ATT’s 
success is the ambiguity of its legal bindingness, especially as to 
States that do not ratify. The ATT was endorsed by a super-
majority (154) of United Nations General Assembly (“UNGA”) 
member States after efforts to reach agreement by consensus 
failed. It will take more than a few law review articles to work 
through precisely which ATT provisions apply to States Parties, 
to States that voted for it but have not ratified it, and to States 
that voted against it. An appreciation of the ATT suggests that 
some of its provisions are taking on a jus cogens aspect in the 
sense that no derogation is allowed even by States that do not 
become States Parties. Other provisions reinforce legal 
obligations, many preceding the ATT, and thereby strengthen 
the execution of international law for stanching the illicit 
conventional arms trade. 14  This Article sidesteps these 
unresolved questions of the ATT’s ambiguous legal status, 
opting to better enable an understanding of what the ATT 
propounds, assuming its effective implementation at both 
national and international levels. Accordingly, in this Article’s 
discussion of ATT requirements, guidance, and prohibitions, 
the unspecific noun States is used.15 
                                                                                                                                     
Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions; is a signatory of 
CIFTA; participates in the Organization of American States Model Regulations for the 
Control of Firearms; participates in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe Document on Small Arms; and participates in the OSCE Principles Governing 
Conventional Arms Transfers). The United States is a State Party to the Convention on 
Transnational Organized Crime and its protocols. See G.A. Res. 55/25, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/55/25 (Nov. 15, 2000). 
14. It is the position of UN Office of Disarmament Affairs that the ATT is binding 
only on ratifying States Parties. See Signature & Ratification, supra note 1. 
15. One example of the quandary of the ATT’s application to non-party States 
arose when negotiators removed a provision that would have required States to make 
feasible efforts to stop transfers of arms that are “adversely impacting the development 
of the importing State.” United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, July 2–
22, 2012, Draft of the Arms Trade Treaty Submitted by the President of the Conference, art. 
4(6), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.217/CRP.1 (Aug. 1, 2012) [hereinafter Draft of the Arms Trade 
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After briefly describing the ATT’s negotiating history and 
adoption (Part I), this Article highlights three sets of substantive 
contributions the ATT makes to international weapons control 
law in the domain of conventional arms. Part II discusses the 
ATT’s prohibitions against supplying conventional arms that 
contribute to the commission of violent international crimes. 
Part III discusses the ATT’s requirements for implementation of 
measures to curtail illicit diversions of conventional arms. Part 
IV discusses the ATT’s obligations on States to regulate aspects 
of the conventional arms market, including establishment of a 
national control system, regulating brokers, and regulating 
conventional arms imports. Altogether, this Article advocates 
appreciation of the ATT as a contribution to advancing the 
international law of controlling weaponized violence. 
I. NEGOTIATION AND ADOPTION OF THE ATT 
The ATT is the culmination of a decade-and-a-half’s efforts 
to control conventional arms dating back at least to 1997 when 
Oscar Arias put forth for global consideration the idea of 
establishing ethical standards for the arms trade. 16  Two 
important developments, discussed more fully below, occurred 
in 2001. First, the UNGA adopted the Firearms Protocol (“FP”) 
to complement the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, propounding measures to 
control small arms, ammunition, parts, and components.17  The 
FP was the first international legal instrument to criminalize 
firearms trafficking and to propound that States should enact 
laws to that end.18 However, as the FP focuses on combating 
organized crime, it does not apply to government sales. 
                                                                                                                                     
Treaty]. Critics argued that this provision might apply to transfers to non-state parties 
and thereby would discourage States from signing and ratifying the Treaty. 
16. Six years later, Arias brought to the United Nations a group of Nobel Peace 
Prize Laureates to promote the concept of a multilateral ATT. See generally DENISE 
GARCIA, DISARMAMENT, DIPLOMACY AND HUMAN SECURITY: REGIMES, NORMS AND 
MORAL PROGRESS (2011).  
17. See Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, 
Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations 
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, May 31, 2001, 2326 U.N.T.S. 208 
[hereinafter Firearms Protocol], available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/
treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf. 
18. Id. art. 5. 
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Second, also in 2001, the UNGA propounded more control 
measures in the nonbinding Programme of Action to Prevent, 
Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in All Its Aspects (“UNPoA”). 19  Its purpose is to 
develop and implement public awareness and confidence-
building programmes in conflict and post-conflict situations with 
regard to the consequences of illicitly traded small arms. Central 
to the UNPoA is that States bear primary responsibility for 
preventing illicit diversion of small arms.20 States should enact 
laws to effectively control the production of small arms and their 
export, import, transit, or retransfer.21 With regard to small 
arms, States should apply markings, keep accurate records, 
regulate brokering, and use authenticated end-user 
certificates.22 States should take legal action against persons and 
entities engaged in the illicit small weapons trade. States are 
encouraged to submit national reports on the implementation 
of the UNPoA23 and to support regional disarmament initiatives, 
particularly in post-conflict situations. 24  While all these 
recommendations are widely valued, some advocates of 
international conventional arms control regretted the UNPoA’s 
nonbinding status as a missed opportunity.25 
Much has been achieved in the past decade. The UNGA 
adopted the International Tracing Instrument (“ITI”)26 to be 
the basis of a worldwide standardized tracing system, without 
which it had been difficult to trace weapons to their source and 
                                                                                                                                     
19. Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms 
and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, U.N. (2006), [hereinafter Small Arms Review 
Conference], available at http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/pdf/PoA.pdf (the 
United States was the lone vote against). 
20. Id. prmb., para. 13. 
21. Id. part II, para. 2. 
22. Id. part II, paras. 6–14. 
23 . To assist States in submitting reports, the United Nations Office for 
Disarmament Affairs has prepared a template and guidelines for the report, both of 
which are available at http://www.un.org  / disarmament/convarms/BMS/bms3/
1BMS3Pages/1ReportingTools.html. 
24. Small Arms Review Conference, supra note 19, part II, para. 30. 
25. See U.N. Secretary-General, Small Arms, S/2008/258 (Apr. 17, 2008). 
26. International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely 
and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons,  Dec. 8, 2005 [hereinafter 
ITI], available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Firearms/
ITI.pdf. 
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thereby hold suppliers accountable.27 States should require that 
firearms be uniquely marked with the manufacturer’s name, the 
country of its manufacture, and its serial number.28 However, 
opposition from the United States, Israel, Egypt, and Japan 
stopped it from becoming legally binding; it is implemented 
through the UNPoA process.29 Meanwhile, Interpol has been 
actively addressing crime involving conventional weapons and 
has established the International Weapons and Explosives 
Tracing System (“IWETS”)—an international database of illicit 
weapons seized by national law enforcement as well as current 
indexes of firearms manufactures.30 
Regional initiatives dealing with the arms trade have had 
notable accomplishments. In Africa, four legally binding 
instruments seek to address the millions of small arms that fuel 
prolonged armed conflicts and crime.31 In Europe, which is 
                                                                                                                                     
27. See generally David H. Pendle, From Minnesota to Mexicali: Connecting the Dots 
with Trafficked Firearms, PROSECUTOR, J. NAT’L DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASS’N, Oct.–Dec. 
2011, at 30. 
28. ITI, supra note 26, part III, para. 8(a). 
29. See SARAH PARKER, ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL REPORTS: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
UN PROGRAMME OF ACTION ON SMALL ARMS AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRACING 
INSTRUMENT IN 2009–10, at 71 (2011), available at http://www.unidir.org/en/
programmes/process-and-practice/analysis-of-states-views-on-an-arms-trade-treaty. 
30. Michel Wery & Ilhan Berkol, Small Arms and Light Weapons Traceability: A 
Comparison of the Principal Existing International Mechanisms, in U.N. INST. FOR 
DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, THE SCOPE AND IMPLICATIONS OF A TRACING MECHANISM FOR 
SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS, at 161, 188–89, U.N. Sales No. GV.E.03.0.7 (2003). 
31 . Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit 
Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (2000), 
available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/ac/csbm/rd/6691.htm; Protocol on the 
Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials, Southern Afr. Dev. 
Cmty., Aug. 2001 (entered into force November 8, 2004), available at http://
www.sadc.int/files/8613/5292/8361/Protocol_on_the_Control_of_Firearms_
Ammunition2001.pdf; Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of 
Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, Apr 
2004 (entered into force May 5, 2006), available at http://www.recsasec.org/
publications/Nairobi_Protocal.pdf; Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, 
Their Ammunition and Other related Material, Econ. Cmty. of W. African States, June 
14, 2006 (entered into force November 20, 2009), available at http://www.poa-iss.org/
RegionalOrganizations/ECOWAS/ECOWAS%20Convention%202006.pdf. Of more 
recent note, although not yet entered into force, is the Central African Convention for 
the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and All Parts and 
Components that can be used for their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly, (adopted 
April 30, 2010), U.N. Doc. A/65/57-S/2010/534. See generally Denise Garcia, Arms 
restraint and regional international law making: The case of the Economic Community of West 
African States, 18 AFRICAN SEC. REV. 78 (2009). 
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more a source of supply (and hence of profit) than of demand, 
the Code of Conduct sets criteria linking arms transfers to the 
recipient nation’s respect for human rights and its ability to buy 
weaponry.32 Moreover, the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (“OSCE”) has adopted the Document on 
Small Arms and Light Weapons33 to foster transparency in arms 
transfers so as to help combat terrorism and organized crime. In 
the Americas, where the flow of arms is closely linked with the 
drug trade and organized crime, the Organization of American 
States (“OAS”) has adopted the Inter-American Convention 
Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, 
Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials 
(“CIFTA”). 34  In Southeast Asia, which is also plagued by 
terrorism as well as by drug and other trafficking, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) convenes 
biannual Ministerial Meetings on Transnational Crime to 
coordinate efforts to combat arms smuggling, but there is no 
regional convention.35 
Negotiation of an internationally binding conventional 
arms treaty, however, remained elusive. In December 2006, the 
UNGA adopted Resolution 61/89, Towards an arms trade treaty: 
establishing common international standards for the import, export and 
transfer of conventional arms, calling for establishment of a group 
                                                                                                                                     
32.  The Council of the European Union, Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, Doc. 
No. 8675/2/98 REV2 (1998), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cmsUpload/08675r2en8.pdf. 
33. Org. for Sec. & Co-operation in Eur., Document on Small Arms and Light 
Weapons, FSC Doc/1/00 (June 20, 2012), available at www.osce.org/fsc/item_11_
13550.html. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (“OSCE”) has 
issued two guides dealing with small arms, the OSCE Handbook of Best Practices on 
Conventional Ammunition (2008), available at http://www.osce.org/fsc/33371, and 
the OSCE Handbook of Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons (2003), 
available at http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/smallarms/OSCEhandbook.pdf. 
34 . Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and 
Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials, Jan. 1, 
1997, 2029 U.N.T.S. 55, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-
63.html. 
35. See Ass’n of Se. Asian Nations, ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime, 
ASEAN Documents on Combating Transnational Crime and Terrorism 9–10 (Apr. 3, 2012), 
http://www.asean.org/resources/archives?task=callelement&format=raw%20&item_
id=5415&element=a0c6d315-bb76-42c6-9ecf-c287d406937b%.20&method=download. 
The last meeting was held in 2012, from July 9–13. Overview: ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, 
ASEAN.ORG, http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-political-security-community/
category/overview-4 (last visited Mar. 23, 2014). 
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of government experts to examine and submit a report on “the 
feasibility, scope and draft parameters for a comprehensive, 
legally binding instrument establishing common international 
standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional 
arms.” 36  The report prepared by the UN Institute for 
Disarmament Research (“UNIDIR”)37 concluded that, due to 
the many conflicting interests of States, the entire UN 
membership should further consider the issues in an open and 
transparent manner.38 In response, the UNGA created the UN 
Open-Ended Working Group (“OEWG”) to explore the 
viability, scope, and draft framework for the proposed arms 
trade treaty.39 
Soon thereafter, the General Assembly called for the UN 
Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty to take place in 2012 in 
order to “elaborate a legally binding instrument on the highest 
possible common international standards for the transfer of 
conventional arms.” 40  In preparation for the 2012 United 
                                                                                                                                     
36. G.A. Res. 61/89, para. 13, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/89 (Dec. 18, 2006). 
37. Over ninety countries provided submissions for this analysis. The analysis 
focused on considerations based on existing obligations and commitments, as well as 
considerations of likely user, likely use, likely impact, and recipient country. Transfer 
criteria with regard to humanitarian rights were of foremost concern for interested 
states, with international humanitarian law and terrorism as the second and third most 
common concerns, respectively. SARAH PARKER, ANALYSIS OF STATES’ VIEWS ON AN ARMS 
TRADE TREATY 10 (2007), available at http://www.unidir.org/en/programmes/process-
and-practice/analysis-of-states-views-on-an-arms-trade-treaty. See generally GARCIA, supra 
note 16.  
38. See G.A. Res. 63/334, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/334 (Aug. 26, 2008). The 
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (“UNIDIR”) also reported that 
there was skepticism from several countries that an arms trade treaty would be feasible 
due to its lofty goals. See Michael Spies, Towards a Negotiating Mandate for an Arms Trade 
Treaty, ACRONYM INST. FOR DISARMAMENT DIPL. (Aug. 1, 2009), http://
www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd91/91att.htm. The United Nations recognized that lack of 
a uniform international standard pertaining to the transfer of small arms and light 
weapons aided crime and terrorism, facilitated conflict, and displaced people; 
consequently undermining peace, safety, and sustainable development. G.A. Res. 
63/334, supra, at 4. 
39. G.A. Res. 63/240, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/240 (Jan. 9, 2009) [hereinafter 
Sec-Gen Report]. The United States was, again, the sole dissenting vote in adopting this 
resolution. 
40. G.A. Res. 64/48, para. 4, U.N. Doc A/RES/64/48 (Jan. 12, 2010). The 
resolution passed with 153 votes, with Zimbabwe being the only nation to vote against. 
See The Arms Trade Treaty: Recorded Vote in the General Assembly, DISARMAMENT 
RESOLUTIONS & DECISIONS DATABASE (Dec. 2, 2009), https://gafc-vote.un.org/
UNODA/vote.nsf/d523afe92781d4d605256705006e0a5d/63e1c71f5d6e11cc852576a
8007788fe?OpenDocument&ExpandSection=3. Notably the United States, the largest 
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Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, four preparatory 
committees (“PrepComs”) were held. The first of the 
Chairman’s Papers, drafted in 2010, detailed the principles, 
goals, and objectives of the ATT and its general outline.41 The 
second draft in 2011 marked the first attempt to write the 
Treaty’s main provisions. 42  In 2012, the third and final 
Chairman’s Draft Paper, presented at the UN Conference on 
the Arms Trade Treaty, provided States with a foundation for 
negotiating the actual Treaty text.43 
One of the most contentious issues was whether to include 
technology transfers44 within the list of transactions or activities 
covered by the treaty. Many States no longer import finished 
weapons but instead incorporate foreign technology into 
equipment that local companies assemble. 45  Subjecting the 
transfer of technology to the same standards as transfers of 
actual arms would prevent States with poor human rights 
records or who should otherwise be denied from getting 
                                                                                                                                     
conventional arms trader in the world, voted in favor of the resolution. This marked a 
drastic change in the United States’ position on the subject, as it had previously been 
the only country to vote against the General Assembly’s resolutions in support of a 
treaty. See Bill Varner, U.S. Backs Arms Trade Treaty at UN, Abandoning Bush Opposition, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 30, 2009, 1:46 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news? pid=
newsarchive&sid=abkyS4.975YM. 
41 . Chairman’s Draft Paper, REACHINGCRITICALWILL.ORG (July 22, 2010), 
http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/att/prepcom1/
docs/ChairDraftPaper.pdf [hereinafter Chairman’s Draft Paper 2010]. 
42 . Chairman’s Draft Paper, REACHINGCRITICALWILL.ORG (July 14, 2011), 
http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/att/prepcom3/
docs/ChairPaper-14July2011.pdf [hereinafter Chairman’s Draft Paper 2011]. 
43 . Discussion Paper, REACHINGCRITICALWILL.ORG (July 3, 2012), http://
reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/att/negotiating-
conference/documents/ChairPaper-3July2012.pdf; Draft of the Arms Trade Treaty, supra 
note 15. See generally The Arms Trade Treaty at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N (July 
2013), http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/arms_trade_treaty. 
44 . Chairman’s Draft Paper 2011, supra note 42, art. 4(2)(f). “Technology 
transfers” were defined as the “export, by tangible or intangible means, of information 
which is required for the design, development, production, manufacture, assembly, 
operation, repair, testing, maintenance or modification of conventional arms.” Id. 
annex A(d). Along with “technology transfers,” “[m]anufacture under foreign license” 
was also covered in the draft. Id. art. 4(2)(e). “Manufacture under foreign license” was 
defined as an “agreement whereby a person or entity in the exporting State grants a 
person or entity in the importing State an authorization to manufacture conventional 
arms which involves technology transfer or the use of technology or conventional arms 
previously supplied by the exporting State.” Id. annex A(c). 
45. See PARKER, supra note 37. 
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enabling production of arms from foreign States that simply 
leave final assemblage for the recipient. However, developing 
countries objected that this provision would excuse denying 
them technology transfers, hampering their development. 46 
Other countries objected that technology transfers could not be 
easily defined or controlled.47 Still others thought inclusion of 
technology transfers would impair their inherent right to self-
defense.48 
Even without reference to technology transfers or 
manufacture under foreign license, consensus on a draft treaty 
could not be reached.49 Iran, Syria, and North Korea objected to 
the draft text’s section on diversions (discussed below).50 The 
General Assembly mandated that another conference be 
commenced in March 2013.51 But that conference again failed 
to reach consensus.52 In response to the failure to reach a 
                                                                                                                                     
46. Cuba asserted that inclusion of technology transfers would hinder civilian use 
of technology for peaceful and legitimate purposes and ultimately hinder the progress 
of developing countries. See United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, July 
2–27, 2012, Compilation of Views on the Elements of an Arms Trade Treaty, at 27, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.217/2 (May 10, 2012) [hereinafter Compilation of Views]. 
47. India asserted that the issue involves commercial, legal, and intellectual 
property issues too complex to be included. Id. at 38; see NGO Comm. on 
Disarmament, Peace & Sec., Report of the Second Preparatory Committee, NGOCDPS.ORG, 
(Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.ngocdps.org/the-second-preparatory-committee/report-of-
the-week-negotiation.  
48. Saudi Arabia asserted that the inclusion of technology transfer would be used 
as a pretext to interfere with States’ internal affairs and would diminish their capacity 
for legitimate self-defense. See Compilation of Views, supra note 46, at 84. 
49. Draft of the Arms Trade Treaty, supra note 15.  
50. Neil MacFarquhar, U.N. Treaty to Control Arms Sales Hits Snag, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
28, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/29/world/iran-and-north-korea-block-
arms-trade-treaty.html?_r=0. 
51.  U.N. GAOR, 67th Sess., 1st Comm., para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/67/L.11 (Oct. 
18, 2012). The resolution passed overwhelmingly with 157 votes for the resolution, zero 
against, and eighteen abstentions. Notably, four of the five largest arm suppliers voted 
in favor of the resolution, with Russia being the abstention. See Daryl G. Kimball, ATT 
Conference Set for March, ARMSCONTROL.ORG (Dec., 2012), http://
www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_12/ATT-Conference-Set-for-March. 
52. Final United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, President’s Non-Paper, 
REACHINGCRITICALWILL.ORG (Mar. 22, 2013), http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/
documents/Disarmament-fora/att/negotiating-conference-ii/documents/president-
nonpaper-22March2013.pdf. A slightly altered draft, Final United Nations Conference 
on the Arms Trade Treaty, President’s Non-Paper, REACHINGCRITICALWILL.ORG (Mar. 
27 ,2013), http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/
att/negotiating-conference-ii/documents/president-nonpaper-27March2013.pdf, 
became the Draft Decision and was submitted by the President of the Final Conference. 
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consensus, British Ambassador, Mark Lyall Grant, sent the “draft 
treaty to Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and asked him on 
behalf of Mexico, Australia and a number of others to put it to a 
swift vote in the General Assembly.”53 
During the UNGA’s 71st plenary meeting, Eduardo 
Ulibarri-Bilbao, the Costa Rican permanent representative, with 
support of over 100 States including the United States, 
introduced a draft resolution calling for the adoption of the 
most recent draft treaty. 54  On April 2, 2013, the General 
Assembly adopted the Arms Trade Treaty with 154 in favor, 
three votes against (Syria, North Korea, and Iran), and twenty-
three abstentions, greatly eclipsing the two-thirds majority 
needed for adoption.55 The Treaty was opened for signatures on 
June 3, 2013; sixty-seven countries signed the Treaty that day.56 
                                                                                                                                     
ATT, supra note 1. Due to the inability to reach consensus, Conference President Peter 
Woolcott concluded that the draft decision would not be adopted as was required by 
Rule 33 of the United Nations Conference on the ATT provisional rules of procedure. 
Final United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, Mar. 18–28, 2013, Report of 
the Final United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, para. 15, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.217/2013/2 (Apr. 2, 2013). Pursuant to Rule 33 of Procedure, President 
Woollcott concluded that no consensus was reached and the draft decision was not 
adopted. This rule states that “[t]he Conference shall take its decisions and consider 
the text of the Treaty by consensus, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 
64/48.” United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, July 2–27, 2012, 
Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Conference, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.21/L.1 (Mar. 7, 
2012). 
53. Louis Charbonneau, U.N. General Assembly to vote on draft arms trade treaty?, 
REUTERS (Apr. 1, 2013) http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/01/us-arms-treaty-
un-idUSBRE9300D020130401. 
54 . The Arms Trade Treaty as Contained in the Annex to Document 
A/CONF.217/2013/L.3, Eduardo Ulibarri-Bilbao, UN Draft Resolution, A/67/L.58, 
available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/67/PV.71. See 
generally Julian Pecquet, US Demands Vote on United Nations Arms Trade Treaty Next Week, 
HILL (March 29, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/un-
treaties/290917--obama-administration-pushes-for-vote-on-un-arms-trade-treaty-next-
week. This draft resolution requested “the Secretary-General, as depositary of the 
Treaty, to open it for signature on 3 June 2013” and called “upon all States to consider 
signing and, thereafter, according to their respective constitutional processes, 
becoming parties to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.” G.A. Res. 67/234 B, paras. 
3–4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/234 B (Apr. 2, 2013). 
55 . For more information, see Draft Resolution Voting Record, U.N. Doc. 
A/67/L.58 (April 2, 2013), available at http://www.un.org/disarmament/update/
20130402/ATTVotingChart.pdf. 
56 . Daryl G. Kimball, Arms Control Ass’n, Arms Trade Treaty At a Glance, 
ARMSCONTROL.ORG (July 2013), http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/arms_trade_
treaty. 
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As of this writing, an additional fifty-one countries have signed 
the Treaty.57 The ATT will officially enter into force ninety days 
after the fiftieth State ratifies, accepts, or approves it. 58  All 
remaining States may, of course, later ratify and accede to the 
Treaty.59  
To support the ATT’s ratification and implementation, the 
UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation 
(“UNSCAR”) has been established as “a multi-donor flexible 
funding mechanism” to promote “South-South cooperation” 
and generally “improve effectiveness of assistance through 
better coordination, monitoring and matching of resources.”60 
Moreover, the ATT’s objective of preventing the diversion of 
weapons and reducing the power of illicit markets overlaps with 
the agendas of the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (“UNODC”) 
and the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs (“UNODA”). The 
UNODC is responsible for enhancing law enforcement 
cooperation, confiscation of assets, and international 
cooperation in criminal matters. 61  The UNODA creates 
                                                                                                                                     
57.  Chapter XXVI Disarmament, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXVI-8&chapter=
26&lang=enMar44. 
58. Id.  
59. ATT, supra note 1, art. 22. 
60. UNSCAR: UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation, U.N. OFF. 
FOR DISARMAMENT AFFS., http://www.un.org/disarmament/UNSCAR (last visited Mar. 
21, 2014). UNSCAR accepts proposals from UN Coordinating Action on Small Arms 
(“CASA”) partners, international organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations, 
research institutes, and governments. UNSCAR, 2013 CALL FOR PROPOSALS 4 (2013), 
available at http://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/
UNSCAR_Call_for_Proposals1.pdf. It is funded by donors, such as Australia, Denmark, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Id. at 7. Since CASA’s 
duties are to operate as a coordinating effort, it is possible that once UNSCAR is fully 
implemented in January 2014, the UN Offices operating under the CASA umbrella may 
be assigned more responsibilities through the ATT. Coordinating Action on Small Arms 
(CASA), U.N. PROGRAMME ACTION–IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT SYSTEM, http://
www.poa-iss.org/CASA/CASA.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2014). And since CASA is 
responsible for the International Small Arms Control Standards (“ISACS”), CASA’s 
role in creating new standards for ATT ratifying states could grow as well. Welcome to 
ISACS, INT’L SMALL ARMS CONTROL STANDARDS, http://www.smallarmsstandards.org 
(last visited March 21, 2014). 
61. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime’s (“UNODC”) Thematic Programme 
(“TP”) on Criminal Justice and Crime Reform strives to ensure consistency in its 
approach to the ATT, based on the UNODC Strategic Framework for the period 2012–
2013 and the UNODC Strategy 2012–2015, and in line with the relevant UN 
Conventions, standards, and norms on crime prevention. The TP “gives an overview of 
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transparent and accountable points of contact regarding 
conventional arms trade that are crucial to ensuring that the 
ATT is respected and upheld. 62  The fulfillment of ATT’s 
objectives will require the commitment of these offices in 
coordination with other parts of the United Nations and law 
enforcement throughout the world. 
II. PROHIBITED CONDUCT UNDER THE ATT 
The central objective of the ATT is to prohibit some but 
not all arms transfers. Prohibiting all arms transfers could 
undermine the pursuit of international peace and security, to 
say nothing of profits. The problem, however, is that leaving the 
distinction between licit and illicit arms transfers to any of nearly 
200 sovereign States has produced the globally anarchic arms 
bazaar of our era. The international community did not have a 
legally binding mechanism to prevent conventional arms from 
flowing to armed conflicts or regions where human rights 
violations are widespread, and there was no widely applicable 
legal instrument holding States responsible for transferring arms 
to a tyrannical regime. 63  The ATT’s primary challenge, 
therefore, is to propound, at the level of international 
governance, criteria for preventing conventional weapons’ 
contribution to humanitarian horror. 
It is worthwhile to briefly consider approaches not taken. 
One option could have been to define which arms transfers are 
allowed and to disallow all transfers that fail to satisfy that 
definition.  This would have created a rebuttable presumption 
against any transfers that could have been rebutted only if an 
arms transfer satisfied criteria of humanitarian law and human 
                                                                                                                                     
outcomes to reach agreed objectives” and “a specific set of indicators” within a global 
framework. In addition, “the TP integrates the various components of the [UNODC’s] 
mandates and expertise in the areas of advocacy, research, setting norms and providing 
technical assistance. As such, it reflects the UN Secretary General’s [PoA] for the 
strengthening of the rule of law at the national and international level.” UNODC, 
Thematic Programme—Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Reform 2012-2015, 
http://issat.dcaf.ch/Community-of-Practice/Resource-Library/Policy-and-Research-
Papers/Thematic-Programme-Crime-Prevention-and-Criminal-Justice-Reform-2012-
2015 (last visited March 21, 2014). 
62 . About Us. UNODA http://www.un.org/disarmament/about/ (last visited 
March 21, 2014). 
63. Hasan, supra note 5, at 4. 
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rights—the normative foundation on which an arms treaty must 
stand. Also, arms transfers could have been prohibited for use to 
commit aggression or repression. Other early suggestions 
emphasized criteria based on the end users’ respect for 
democratic rights and norms, non-engagement in armed 
conflict, and intolerance of organized crime. It was proposed to 
prohibit transfers that seriously impair poverty reduction and 
socio-economic development or hamper the sustainable 
development of the recipient State. Negotiators removed a 
provision that would have required states to make feasible 
efforts to stop transfers of arms that are “[a]dversely impacting 
the development of the importing State.”64 A significant debate 
concerned whether to include an absolute ban on arms transfers 
to non-State actors.65 
The problem with all these formulations is that their 
precise application is elusive and highly contextual, entailing 
perpetual nuance and enabling each sovereign State to decide 
when to transfer arms to support the right of insurrection or 
self-defense, among other legally contentious concepts. A 
notable attribute of the ATT is its implicit recognition that the 
criteria of distinction between legal and prohibited arms 
transfers must clearly and consistently guide national arms 
export licensors. The goal of prohibiting illicit transfers would 
be of scant value, no matter now nobly intended, if export 
control officials could not apply objective criteria to actually stop 
prohibited arms transfers. 
Put positively, the goal of prohibiting illicit arm transfers is 
best accomplished by specifying criteria that have reasonably 
clear legal significance for all States’ law enforcers—criteria that 
compel policy reform to stanch the flow of conventional arms 
and which can be harmonized among nations in order to enable 
optimal multilateral cooperation against traffickers. 66  A key 
lesson from both nuclear and chemical arms control that is 
incorporated into the ATT is that to optimally contribute to 
                                                                                                                                     
64. Draft of the Arms Trade Treaty, supra note 15, art. 4(6)(e). 
65. Nathan A. Sears, Controlling Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation: The 
Potential of the Arms Trade Treaty, 12 PATERSON REV. INT’L AFF. 35, 46–47 (2012). 
66. See Facilitator’s Summary on Implementation and Application, GENEVA-ACADEMY.CH 
(July 22, 2010), http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/pdf/Implement-and-applica-
22.07.2010.pdf. 
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international peace and security and reduce human suffering, a 
weapons control treaty should exactly define prohibited 
activities concerning weapons.67 
In the end, the ATT does not provide criteria for lawful 
arms transfers, leaving foreign policy choices entirely in the 
hands of individual States. Instead, two ATT articles prohibit 
arms transfers that would constitute an offense against already 
binding international obligations. The prohibitions contained in 
the ATT thus reiterate legal obligations that States are already 
bound to obey. Article 6 prohibits arms transfers that contravene 
UN Security Council embargoes and other international 
agreements relating to the international conventional arms 
trade, or would be used to commit grave international crimes.68 
Article 7 requires an objective assessment of each arms transfer 
and prohibits transfers if the State determines that the transfer 
poses “an overriding risk” of contributing to serious violations of 
international humanitarian or human rights law, including 
serious acts of gender-based violence, or violations of 
international conventions relating to terrorism and 
transnational organized crime.69 
A. Prohibited Arms Transfers Under Article 6 
Article 6 of the ATT contains three prohibitions. Article 6.1 
prohibits States from authorizing transfers of conventional arms 
in violation of measures such as arms embargoes adopted by the 
UN Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter. 
Article 6.2 prohibits a State from transferring arms in violation 
of international treaties and agreements relating to the transfer 
or trafficking of conventional arms. Article 6.3 prohibits arms 
transfers if the exporting State knows that the arms would be 
used to commit genocide, crimes against humanity, grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, or other war crimes 
including attacks directed against civilians. While Article 6.2 
merely reiterates obligations already assumed by States and 
                                                                                                                                     
67. See generally Nicholas Marsh, Two Sides of the Same Coin? The Legal and Illegal 
Trade in Small Arms, 9 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 217 (2002). 
68. ATT, supra note 1, art. 6.3. 
69. Id. art. 7. 
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therefore needs no further elaboration, the other two provisions 
merit attention. 
1. Prohibition Against Transfers of Embargoed or Otherwise 
Restricted Arms 
Security Council Resolutions under Chapter VII are the 
supreme determinations of how the United Nations maintains 
international peace and security. 70  The Security Council is 
endowed with responsibility to take necessary measures to 
control situations that threaten international peace and security, 
including imposition of arms embargoes that prohibit all 
Member States from transferring certain weapons to the 
embargoed government or entity. 71  Security Council arms 
embargoes were used twice during the Cold War, namely against 
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) in 1968 and South Africa in 1977, 
but their use accelerated after 1990. 72  More recently, the 
Security Council has prohibited supplying weapons to terrorists; 
while not technically an embargo targeted at any particular 
State, SC Resolution 1373 was adopted pursuant to Chapter VII 
of the Charter and therefore would fall within the scope of the 
ATT’s prohibition.73 
                                                                                                                                     
70. See generally Sean Murphy, The Role of the United Nations with Respect to the Means 
for Accomplishing the Maintenance and Restoration of Peace, 26 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 115, 
116–17 (1996). 
71 . A decision to impose an arms embargo follows a Security Council 
determination of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression that 
makes necessary the sanction’s imposition. Article 41 authorizes the Security Council to 
apply non-military enforcement measures. U.N. Charter art. 41. Dr. Hasan explains 
how the wording used in a resolution represents the legal weight of each resolution, 
differentiating between resolutions that call upon all States and resolutions that decide 
that all States shall—the latter being more forceful. Hasan, supra note 5, at 159. 
72. Sanctions were imposed on Somalia (1992), the National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia (“NPEL”), Libya (1992), Rwanda (1992), the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(1996), Sierra Leone (1997), Afghanistan (1998), Eritrea and Ethiopia (2000), Iran 
(2006), and Libya (2011). United Nations Security Council Sanctions Committees, UNITED 
NATIONS (Jan. 2006), http://www.un.org/sc/committees/; Hasan, supra note 5, at 162. 
Dr. Hasan notes that fifty-seven armed conflicts raged during this period and that the 
sanctions against Afghanistan and Sudan are unique in that their arms embargoes 
followed other, more general embargoes, whereas all of the others led with arms 
embargoes. See Hasan, supra note 5, at 176. See James D. Fry, Of Pinpricks and Cannon 
Shots: UN Arms Embargoes and Peacekeeping as Coercive Disarmament Measures, 17 U.C. 
DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 213, 217 (2011). 
73. Paragraph 2 states that States shall “[r]efrain from providing any form of 
support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by 
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Because conventional arms are the weapons of choice in 
most conflicts, they constitute the majority of transfers that can 
be impacted by an embargo.74 Arms embargoes are widely seen 
as smarter and preferable to economic embargoes because they 
target the combatants and limit humanitarian impacts, thereby 
inducing military stalemates and preventing conflicts from 
escalating.75 As of this writing, there are ten Security Council 
embargoes that include a prohibition of transferring arms, 
ammunition, military equipment, goods, and related services to 
targeted States, armed groups, or individuals.76  
Imposition of arms embargoes is highly controversial. Some 
critics allege they are ineffective and have a low rate of 
compliance.77 With so many small arms available in the market, 
an embargo still leaves a purchaser with a range of sellers in the 
international marketplace.78 Arms embargoes have no impact on 
stockpiles of weapons that the combatants have accumulated 
before imposition of the embargo and no Security Council arms 
embargo has prescribed mechanisms for collecting and 
                                                                                                                                     
suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of 
weapons to terrorists.” S.C. Res. 1373, para 2(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sep. 28, 
2001).  
74. Hasan supra, note 5, at 46. 
75. Gary C. Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg, Targeted Sanctions: A Policy Alternative?, 32 
LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 11, 12 (2000). 
76. Indeed, whenever the Security Council has imposed sanctions, it always has 
included an arms embargo on the target State. See Use of Sanctions under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter, UNITED NATIONS (Jan. 2006), http://www.un.org/sc/committees. 
77. “There are repeated violations of the arms embargoes, in particular the 
continuing transfer of small arms, as the United Nations Secretary General admitted in 
his report, investigations of arms embargo violations have exposed international 
networks involved in the illicit trade and brokering of small arms.” Hasan, supra note 5, 
at 164. See generally Jennifer L. Erickson, Stopping the Legal Flow of Weapons: Compliance 
with Arms Embargoes, 1981–2004, 50 J. PEACE RES. 159 (2013); Guy Lamb, Beyond 
‘Shadow-boxing’ and ‘Lip service’: The Enforcement of Arms Embargoes in Africa, INST. FOR. 
SEC. STUD. 2 (Apr. 2007), http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper135.pdf. 
78. The arms embargo imposed on the former Yugoslavia by Security Council 
Resolution 713 (1991), for example, did not work well to stop the flow of arms as the 
weapons kept coming to the warring parties through the use of covert government 
supplies or the black market. See Michael R. Fowler & Jessica Fryrear, Collective Security 
and the Fighting in the Balkans, 30 N. KY. L. REV. 299, 333 (2003) (discussing how the 
arms embargo in the Balkans in 1992 only prolonged the fighting). The arms embargo 
imposed on Somalia since 1992 has not substantially cut off the availability of small 
arms there; the quantity and diversity of small arms available in Somalia are greater 
now than at any time since the early 1990s. Hasan, supra note 5, at 164. 
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destroying amassed weapons. 79  Indeed, violence could long 
persist in an area already flooded with weapons before an 
embargo was imposed. 
If an arms embargo does work, it may penalize the weaker 
party, often ensuring a one-sided military victory. Thus, arms 
embargoes have been accused of tending to favor the warring 
faction that has access to government military ordnance and 
industries while making it very difficult for adversaries to 
organize and defend themselves. 80  Most important for this 
discussion, some experts contend that arms embargoes, 
especially in view of their weak enforcement and poor 
monitoring, accelerate trafficking. Traffickers’ profits may 
accelerate with the imposition of an embargo, creating lucrative 
markets for illicit trade. “These profits enrich precisely those 
people that the embargo is intended to hurt, creating a financial 
interest in prolonged conflict.”81 
The issue of how international law treats noncompliance 
with arms embargoes is complicated because there are virtually 
no sanctions for violations, especially by non-State actors who 
transfer weapons to the embargoed group. 82  Each State is 
responsible for enforcing compliance in its own courts pursuant 
to its own export control laws. Until the ATT, there was no 
explicit international legal requirement that States effectively 
implement such laws, much less that they punish export control 
violators. The Security Council has established the Sanctions 
Committee to monitor and verify that an arms embargo is not 
being violated but it has no fixed mechanism to prevent 
                                                                                                                                     
79. In addition, in a situation where the conflict is dependent on home-grown 
weaponry, an externally sanctioned arms embargo has little or no relevance to 
reducing the armed conflict. See generally DAMIEN FRUCHART ET AL., UNITED NATIONS 
ARMS EMBARGOES: THEIR IMPACT ON ARMS FLOWS AND TARGET BEHAVIOUR 54 (2007). 
80. Arguably, the arms embargo against the former Yugoslavia by resolution 713 
(1991) was “‘fundamentally unjust because it locked in place the pre-war balance of 
power, unfairly disadvantaged the Bosnian forces, and thereby unnecessarily prolonged 
the conflict.’” Hasan, supra note 5, at 163–64 (citations omitted). 
81. Hufbauer & Oegg, supra note 75. 
82. The UN Security Council has requested that Member States pass national 
legislation making violation of an arms embargo a criminal offense. S.C. Res. 1196, 
para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1196 (Sept. 16, 1998). 
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sanctioned arms transfers. Instances of a supplier State being hit 
with sanctions for transferring small arms illegally are rare.83 
The ATT does not resolve the myriad debates that the 
Security Council must undertake whenever it considers arms 
embargoes, nor could it add any legal weight to whatever the 
Security Council may decide to do. The General Assembly does 
not have authority to add or subtract in this context. What is 
significant is that the ATT’s first prohibition is for transfers that 
violate Security Council embargoes. Article 6.1 reaffirms the 
Security Council’s authority over matters of international peace 
and security and leaves to the Security Council the policy merits 
of imposing an arms embargo.  Its importance is to clarify that 
when an arms embargo is imposed, an arms transfers from a 
State’s jurisdiction is an international wrong—a delict—for 
which the supplier State must be responsible. 
Thus, the ATT links violations of Security Council arms 
embargoes to the widening legal implications of State 
responsibility, 84  raising the potential for States to be held 
responsible for complicity in an embargoed transfer. Viewed 
from the perspective of arms supplier States, before the ATT, 
the Security Council’s arms embargoes were matters of 
exclusively political responsibility. A supplier State might suffer 
the indignation of other States if conventional arms from its 
jurisdiction were transferred (by whatever means) to a targeted 
State, but only if the evidence of such transfers was sufficiently 
manifest and no other political factors counselled in its favor.85 
After the ATT, a supplier State has to consider that prohibited 
                                                                                                                                     
83. In 2001, the UN Security Council imposed a new round of sanctions on 
Liberian President Charles Taylor for arming the embargoes forces of the 
Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone. S.C. Res. 1343, para. 6, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1343 (Mar. 7, 2001). 
84. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
with commentaries, Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53rd Sess., Apr. 23–June 1, July 2–
Aug. 10, 2001, at 55 (2001) [hereinafter ILC Responsibility]. See generally Theresa A. 
DiPerna, Small Arms and Light Weapons: Complicity “With a View” Toward Extended State 
Responsibility, 20 FLA J. INT’L L. 25 (2008). 
85 . The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (“SIPRI”) has 
recommended that the Security Council should target the States and non-State actors 
implicated in the violations of an arms embargo by at least naming and shaming. In 
practice, it may mean the non-compliant countries and/or entities are explicitly 
mentioned in the related report and meetings. See Paul Holtom & Mark Bromley, 
Implementing an Arms Trade Treaty: Lessons on Reporting and Monitoring from Existing 
Mechanisms (Stockholm Int’l Peace Research Inst., Policy Paper No. 282011). 
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arms transfers from its jurisdiction are, by operation of legal 
doctrine, its responsibility for which it can be held legally 
accountable. 
Even more far-reaching is that the ATT links the mandate 
of arms embargoes to the requirements of establishing a 
national control system and requiring adoption of measures to 
prevent small arms diversions, discussed below. Thus, a Security 
Council arms embargo, before the ATT, was a negative 
command against transferring embargoed arms, but positive 
obligations to prevent wrongful arms transfers by private parties 
or unauthorized government officials went unspecified. 
Accordingly, there was no likely price to pay if a supplier State’s 
involvement in the wrongful transfer was limited to failing to 
have a legal infrastructure that could effectively bar the transfer. 
After the ATT’s imposition of positive obligations to establish 
such an infrastructure, passivity in the face of prohibited 
conduct is no longer a defense. 
As an aside, it has been argued that the ATT will undercut 
United States embargoes that are typically more severe and 
comprehensive than Security Council embargoes: 
Because the projected universal treaty will be based upon 
the consensus views of all participating U.N. member states, 
it will enshrine the lowest-common-denominator standards 
for importing, exporting, and transferring conventional 
weapons. The treaty’s standards will therefore be lower than 
U.S. standards. It would also open the U.S. to a legal 
challenge—albeit a frivolous one—from embargoed states 
such as Iran, which would argue that the U.S. is illegally 
constraining trade with it and is violating the “common 
international standards” enshrined in the treaty.86 
It is of course true that the United States has rigorously 
restrictive arms export embargoes that are designed to achieve 
its foreign policy objectives. But it is patently nonsense to argue 
that US embargoes violate international law or standards or 
somehow contradict the language of the ATT, which in no way 
                                                                                                                                     
86. Theodore R. Bromund & Steven Groves, The U.N.’s Arms Trade Treaty: A 
Dangerous Multilateral Mistake in the Making, HERITAGE FOUND. (Aug. 21, 2009), http://
www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/08/the-uns-arms-trade-treaty-a-dangerous-
multilateral-mistake-in-the-making. 
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requires arms transfers in contravention of any nation’s policies, 
including the United States. 
2. Prohibition Against Arms Transfers for Committing Grave 
International Crimes 
The list of grave crimes in ATT Article 6.3 are the core 
crimes of the Rome Statute and prosecutable in the 
International Criminal Court.87 These are crimes that exceed all 
others in scope, heinousness, and severity of consequences,88 
and these are crimes that virtually always entail substantial 
quantities of conventional arms. Yet, as long-abhorred as these 
crimes are, culpability has not extended to the suppliers of arms 
to the perpetrators of inhumane crimes. Arms suppliers of 
perpetrators of heinous crimes have not been held liable for 
those crimes absent more extensive evidence of having been 
engaged in the crimes as a joint criminal enterprise. Indeed, 
prosecutions of conventional weapons sellers for their buyers’ 
international crimes have been less than rare since the 
prosecution of Nazi industrialists at Nuremberg.89 
The ATT Article 6.3 prohibition is significant, therefore, in 
that it extends responsibility for grave international crimes to 
the supplying State.90 This is an important accretion to the law of 
State responsibility for it means that the authorization of such 
                                                                                                                                     
87. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90. 
88 . See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: HISTORICAL 
EVOLUTION AND CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION (2011). 
89. See generally Allison Marston Danner, The Nuremberg Industrialist Prosecutions 
and Aggressive War, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 651 (2005). 
90. Ramadansyah Hasan has argued that 
The Articles demand States maximize the law’s capacity in using the ILC 
principle to hold responsible those who are responsible for assisting the 
commission of human rights violations and other internationally wrongful 
acts. . . . Based on article 16 of the ILC’s Articles on State responsibility, a 
State transferring to a recipient State which later uses the arms to commit 
internationally wrongful acts may be held accountable for having a 
supporting role. However, there are limits to the scope of responsibility of 
article 16; the first, the assisting State must have knowledge of the 
circumstances that make the conduct of the receiving State unlawful; 
secondly, the supply of weapons must be given with the view to facilitating the 
commission of the wrongful act; thirdly, the act must be such that it would 
have been wrongful had it been executed by the assisting State itself.  
Hasan, supra note 5, at 142 
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arms transfers constitutes commission of a newly pronounced 
international wrong, and every arms-transferring official is at risk 
of violating the ATT if authorized transfers of arms are used to 
commit grave international crimes. 
The key to establishing responsibility for this wrong is the 
requirement of “knowledge at the time of authorization.” 
Knowledge is a legal standard that is higher than strict liability but 
lower than international criminal law’s requirement of intention 
to aid and abet the wrongful act. Knowledge is a legal standard 
that is not often used in international arms control treaties. In 
the domain of public international law, the knowledge standard is 
invoked most in connection with the imputability of actions by 
subordinate officials to the State: When is the State responsible 
for an official’s knowledge? This can be a difficult question, 
especially in situations (e.g. human rights violations) where the 
State has failed to prevent wrongful acts because it allegedly did 
not know of the wrongful behavior; had it known, it would be at 
least arguable that it was responsible for undertaking 
appropriate action.91  
In the domain of corporate law, civil suits against corporate 
decisionmakers may proceed for violating a legal obligation of 
which a corporate official should have had knowledge. This 
constitutes a low threshold of responsibility.92 This standard 
                                                                                                                                     
91. Ingrid Wuerth has argued that:  
[M]otivation is generally irrelevant in evaluating acquiescence as evidence of 
opinio juris. Others have noted that if customary international law is grounded 
in state consent, then acquiescence should count only if a state “know[s] that 
failure to object will be taken as acceptance.” Indeed, acquiescence is often 
criticized as a basis for inferring the consent of states to customary 
international law because nations may acquiesce from a lack of legal interest 
in the issue, from a lack of knowledge that their actions will be interpreted as 
acquiescence, or for other policy reasons.  
Ingrid Wuerth, Pinochet’s Legacy Reassessed, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 731, 750 (2012). 
92. Angela Walker, The Hidden Flaw in Kiobel: Under the Alien Tort Statute the Mens 
Rea Standard for Corporate Aiding and Abetting Is Knowledge, 10 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RIGHTS, 
119 (2011). Under the law of civil remedies, in both civil and common law 
jurisdictions, a company may be liable if a reasonable corporate official exercising 
relevant responsibility, with the information reasonably available at the time, would 
have known that there was a risk that its actions could cause a prohibited harm. To 
determine what a reasonable corporate official should have known, courts consider 
best practices in due diligence and risk assessment. Accordingly, as societal 
expectations develop and expand, the expectations placed on a reasonable company 
will as well. 
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importantly applies in human rights actions where a legal entity 
may have legal responsibility if the authorized official knows that 
the entity’s conduct poses a reasonable risk of contributing to 
such abuses.93 In these contexts ‘willful blindness’—the act of 
disabling access to knowledge—is not permitted by the law of 
civil remedies.94 The requisite knowledge standard may be even 
lower in connection with environmental harm: an entity may be 
held liable even where it has no actual knowledge but, as a 
matter of precautionary obligation, it should have taken 
deliberate steps to find out about the potential harm caused by 
its activities.95 
The knowledge standard in ATT Article 6.3, in light of the 
treaty’s avowed purpose to stanch the illicit international arms 
trade, means that if an authorized official should have known 
about the risks that transferred arms will be used to commit 
grave international crimes, it is an international wrong to 
authorize those transfers and responsibility must follow. More 
specifically, knowledge may refer to the following markers: (1) an 
authorized official’s own inquiries produce information, or the 
authorized official should have undertaken such inquiries; (2) 
information is publicly available, including reports by the 
United Nations, other governments, the media, and relevant 
publicists; (3) information is brought to the official by an outside 
source such as an NGO; and (4) circumstances are sufficiently 
unusual to put reasonable officials on notice, in light of their 
entire legal responsibilities, of a suspicious purpose for a 
particular transfer. 
All this would suggest that the knowledge standard is satisfied 
if wrongful activity is brought to official attention and if relevant 
officials do not undertake reasonable measures to investigate 
and stop the authorization of that transfer if the circumstances 
warrant. Failure to have an effectively operating export control 
                                                                                                                                     
93. See generally ILIAS BANTEKAS, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (4th ed. 2010) 
for discussion of dolus eventualis, where an actor knows that harm may occur as a result 
of its conduct, and even though it hopes that the harm does not take place, it consents 
to the harm by carrying out the course of conduct anyway. 
94. Walker, supra note 92. 
95. Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, 
[2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 146, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2). 
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system in place is no defense; indeed, it might be evidence of 
State responsibility for the wrongful transfer. 
B. Prohibition on Arms Transfers That Contribute to Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Law Violations or to Violations of Terrorism and 
Crime Conventions 
Article 6’s prohibitions do not require any particular action 
except to not transfer banned arms. Article 7 operates 
differently, obligating States to assess all exports’ potential for 
negative consequences. If the exporting State determines that 
there is an overriding risk of such consequences, it shall not 
authorize the export. Article 7 defines negative consequences as 
violations of: (1) international humanitarian law; (2) 
international human rights law; (3) international conventions or 
protocols relating to terrorism; 96  and (4) international 
conventions or protocols relating to transnational organized 
crime.97 
In contrast to Article 6’s prohibitions that should apply 
objectively, Article 7 represents an explicit requirement for each 
State to consider certain implications every time it authorizes an 
arms transfer; it further requires each State to refuse to export 
arms that it determines pose an overriding risk of proscribed 
harms. This is not a per se obligation; it is conceivable that an 
assessment undertaken in good faith fails to identify even an 
appreciable risk that the arms will be used wrongfully. In 
                                                                                                                                     
96. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 
U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; International Convention Against the Taking of 
Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, TIAS 11081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205; International Convention for 
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997, 2149 U.N.T.S. 256; International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, TIAS 
13075 2178 U.N.T.S. 197; International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of 
Nuclear Terrorism, Apr. 13, 2005, 2445 U.N.T.S. 89. 
97. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 
2000, TIAS 13127, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209 and the Protocols Thereto. These protocols 
include: Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319; Protocol against the 
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 2241 U.N.T.S., 507; 
Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts 
and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime, May 31, 2001, 2326 U.N.T.S. 208. 
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international law terms, the ATT’s assessment requirement is 
one of conduct, not of result. Thus, a transfer of arms to a 
recipient who uses them for a proscribed harm does not signify 
per se that the exporting State has violated Article 7. 
The ATT gives little criteria for the conduct of such 
assessment, requiring that it be done “in an objective and non-
discriminatory manner, taking into account relevant factors, 
including information provided by the importing State.”98 It is 
difficult, accordingly, to specify the conditions for establishing 
that a State has or has not complied with Article 7. But there can 
be no unassessed legal arms transfers. Put negatively, the ATT 
Article 7 prohibition means that an exporting State may not 
claim legal innocence for its arms transfers on the grounds that, 
under its regulatory system, it made no inquiry about the risk 
that the purchaser of the exported arms will use them to violate 
international law. As with regard to Article 6.3’s requirement of 
knowledge, the defense of willful blindness is now unavailable. 
Yet, Article 7’s scope is far broader than that of Article 6.3. 
Article 6.3 is concerned only with the gravest international 
crimes which, precisely because of their unusual degree of 
heinousness, resonate throughout humanity’s conscience. Yet, 
there are many violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law that do not satisfy the rigorous criteria of 
grave international crimes. Comparably, the scope of 
international terrorism conventions and international 
conventions against transnational crime cumulatively prescribe 
interwoven regulatory obligations on States’ execution of law 
enforcement responsibilities. 
The ATT, by incorporating these very dynamic domains of 
international law, adds the mandate of a State determination, 
pursuant to an assessment, that an arms export pose no 
overriding risk of contributing to any such violations. Each State 
retains authority to make that determination by itself; the earlier 
discussed subjective considerations inherent in terms as broad as 
“international human rights” and “international humanitarian 
law” are to be resolved at the national level, but they must not 
be ignored at the national level. 
                                                                                                                                     
98. ATT, supra note 1, art. 7. 
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In this regard, ATT Article 7 may offer some of the promise 
of achieving what environmental impact assessments have 
achieved in a very different domain. In both contexts, there 
must be official consideration of the impacts of a proposed 
action for broadly defined consequences. The requirement to 
assess does not mandate specific substantive outcomes in 
particular situations. Yet, mandating that an official assessment 
be undertaken has important salutary effects by making it 
difficult for officials, in assessing evidence of human rights 
violations, to then authorize arms transfers despite their own 
assessment. A mandated assessment process certainly removes 
the we didn’t know defense, and the process of assessing enables 
advocacy by proponents of curtailing arms transfers.  
The Article 7 assessment requirement will likely be 
executed with Article 11.2’s requirement that States, in 
connection with any conventional arms transfer, assess the risk 
that transferred conventional arms could be diverted.99 Article 
11.2 focuses principally on the potential that the named 
recipient will never receive the arms or at least will not hold 
them for long, rather than on what the final recipient is likely to 
do with the weapons. The 11.2 assessment must focus on 
manifestly criminal behavior, such as theft, smuggling, or fraud. 
Consideration must be devoted not only to the end user’s reason 
for wanting the arms, but also its ability to secure them 
throughout the arms’ useful lives. And the risk of theft or 
misdirection during the arms’ transit route and at ports through 
which the arms will pass must also be assessed. 
Altogether, the ATT prohibits conventional arms transfers 
unless the State determines, following an assessment, that the 
conventional arms will not be used to commit international 
wrongs or be diverted for such purposes. At a minimum, an 
assessment means consideration of available information, and 
the ATT contains extensive information gathering and 
exchange requirements. For example, each importing State 
must provide, upon request, relevant information to the 
exporting State to assist it in conducting its assessment. 100 
Moreover, the exporting State Party must ensure that all 
                                                                                                                                     
99. Id. art. 11.2. 
100. Id. art. 8.1. 
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authorizations for the exported arms are detailed and issued in 
advance and must make available information about the 
exported arms, upon request, to the importing State Party and 
to the transit or trans-shipment States Parties. 101  After an 
authorization has been granted, if an exporting State Party 
becomes aware of new relevant information, it is encouraged to 
reassess the authorization after consultations, if appropriate, 
with the importing State.102 This entire process will be informed 
by UN officials working with many NGOs who have, 
unfortunately, too many years’ experience of monitoring the 
flood of arms to committers of atrocities and other criminals. 
III. ANTI-DIVERSION MEASURES 
Diversion is the act of shifting conventional arms from legal 
to illicit markets. The illicit conventional arms market is 
estimated, by dollar value, to account for twenty percent of all 
conventional arms transactions. 103  The distinction between 
prohibiting certain authorized arms transfers and addressing 
illicit conventional arms diversion is important as a matter of 
State responsibility. States are, by definition, subjects of 
international law in the sense that they are bound by it and 
violations of international law must incur responsibility,104 but 
criminals are objects of law who must be addressed by 
empowering transnational law enforcement. 
Yet, to see these topics in isolation is to miss the 
connections between wrongly authorized transfers and diverted 
arms. As most diversion of conventional arms entails complicity 
of government agents,105 enforcing prohibitions against States 
transferring conventional arms for illegal purposes contributes 
to and is reinforced by effective policies to stanch the illicit arms 
                                                                                                                                     
101. Id. art. 7.6. 
102. Id. art. 7.7 
103. See generally WENDY CUKIER, THE ILLICIT TRADE IN SMALL ARMS: ADDRESSING 
THE PROBLEM OF DIVERSION, PLOUGHSHARES REPORT (2008). 
104. Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, 
supra note 95, art. 1 (“Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the 
international responsibility of that State.”). 
105. See generally Rachel Stohl, Fighting the Illicit Trafficking of Small Arms, SAIS REV. 
INT’L AFFS., Winter–Spring 2005, at 59. 
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market. Stanching criminal transfers and prohibiting States’ 
wrongful transfers are the twin pillars on which the ATT is built. 
Diversion occurs by varied means, depending on the 
specific types of weapons, their age and location, and the legal 
user’s degree of control, among other factors. It is unclear how 
much of the illicit weapons market is represented by re-use of 
durable arms, diversion of arms from licit markets, or sale of 
new arms. Indeed, to refer to “the illicit conventional arms 
trade” is to suggest a singularity that in fact does not exist. The 
illicit flow of guns across the US-Mexico border 106  follows 
different incentives and faces different law enforcement 
opposition than does the flow of weapons through southwest 
Asia or the flow of weapons into sub-Saharan Africa.107 In some 
contexts, conventional arms are linked to narcotics trafficking,108 
while in other contexts conventional arms are linked to human 
rights atrocities or fanatical terrorism.109 Generalizations as to all 
these markets should be offered cautiously. Moreover, the 
nature of illicit trafficking limits the availability of reliable data 
about the sources of arms used in crime and conflict. Studies 
based on recovered weapons represent a small fraction of 
weapons used.110 
What may be reasonably offered is the increasing evidence 
of intersection of global criminal networks capable of adapting 
flexible routings as necessary to meet constantly fluctuating 
demand, operating in a gray zone of legality and taking 
                                                                                                                                     
106. See Arindrajit Dube et al., Cross-Border Spillover: U.S. Gun Laws and Violence in 
Mexico, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 397, 402 (2012). 
107. See Stephanie L. Kotecki, The Human Rights Costs of China’s Arms Sales to 
Sudan—A Violation of International Law on Two Fronts, 17 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 209 
(2008). 
108. See Asif Efrat, Governing Guns, Opposing Opium: A Theory of Internationally 
Regulated Goods 29 (Cornell Law School, Working Paper No. 41, 2008), available at 
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clsops_papers/41. 
109. See JOHN ROLLINS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41004, INTERNATIONAL 
TERRORISM AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME: SECURITY THREATS, U.S. POLICY, AND 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS 10 (2010). 
110. While the International Criminal Police Organization (“Interpol”) collects 
and aggregates data annually through the Interpol Weapons Electronic Tracing System 
(“IWETS”), participation in IWETS is voluntary and the number of incidents reported 
is relatively low. WENDY CUKIER & VICTOR W. SIDEL, THE GLOBAL GUN EPIDEMIC: FROM 
SATURDAY NIGHT SPECIALS TO AK-47S, at 89 (2005). 
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advantage of licit markets whenever possible.111 Much of today’s 
illicit market for conventional arms has evolved from 
superpower operations during the long and lucrative Cold War. 
Its end has driven arms producers and distributors to take 
advantage of transnational smuggling networks that have 
sustained much of the world’s violence. Today’s transferors of 
illicit arms take advantage of and reinforce an international 
criminal infrastructure for money-laundering, identity fraud, 
and human trafficking. 
Links, interactions, and dependencies among different 
networks suggest that there are no simple solutions to the 
problems of the proliferation and misuse of these weapons. 
Licit, covert, and illicit networks for large-scale distribution 
of small arms and ammunition share various transportation, 
banking, and personnel networks, thereby creating a 
complex global system.112 
The ATT’s provisions for combating these networks stand 
atop measures promulgated by the Firearms Protocol, the UN 
Program of Action, the International Tracing Instrument, 
numerous regional and sub-regional efforts, and the efforts of 
international organizations including Interpol to strengthen 
national law enforcement so as to make illicit arms trading more 
difficult. For example, Article 9 requires each State Party to 
regulate, where necessary and feasible, the transit or trans-
shipment of conventional arms through its territory or under its 
jurisdiction. This provision reinforces the obligation in the 
Firearms Protocol, supra, for transit States to give written notice 
that there is no objection to the transit.113 
                                                                                                                                     
111. See Gretchen Peters, The Intersection of Crime and Conflict, in THE “NEW” FACE 
OF TRANSNATIONAL CRIME ORGANIZATIONS (TCOS): A GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVE AND 
IMPLICATIONS TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 81, 85 (Ben Riley & Kathleen Kiernan eds., 
2013), available at http://hdl.handle.net/10945/30346; Vesna Markovic, The 
Contemporary Face of Transnational Criminal Organizations and the Threat They Pose to U.S. 
National Interest: A Global Perspective, in THE “NEW” FACE OF TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 
ORGANIZATIONS (TCOS), supra, at 110, 118; JEREMY HAKEN, TRANSNATIONAL CRIME IN 
THE DEVELOPING WORLD (2011); Regan Damron, Game-Changing Developments in the 
Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons: Anonymizing Technologies and Additive 
Manufacturing, in THE “NEW” FACE OF TRANSNATIONAL CRIME ORGANIZATIONS (TCOS), 
supra, at 160.  
112. CUKIER, supra note 103.  
113. Firearms Protocol, supra note 17, art. 10.2 
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Thus, the ATT reinforces legal principles that have been 
well-appreciated in the United Nations for at least the past two 
decades. The ATT’s importance, from the perspective of 
international law, is that there is mounting evidence that 
combating the illicit trade in conventional arms is now a matter 
of mutual or humanity-wide interest. Put differently, diversion of 
conventional arms transfers is emerging into an international 
crime. 
ATT Article 11 propounds measures to combat 
conventional arms diversion. As earlier discussed, States must 
assess the risks of diversion of a transfer of conventional arms, 
including by conducting an examination of the parties involved 
in the transfer and by requiring additional documentation. In 
light of that assessment, exporting States must consider 
establishing “mitigation measures such as confidence-building 
measures or jointly developed and agreed programmes.” 114 
Indeed, all States involved in the transfer of conventional arms, 
including import, transit, trans-shipment and export States, 
should cooperate and exchange information to mitigate the risk 
of diversion.115 More generally, States Parties are encouraged to 
share information with one another on effective measures to 
address diversion including information on corruption, 
international trafficking routes, illicit brokers (discussed below), 
sources of illicit supply, methods of concealment, common 
points of dispatch, and destinations used by organized groups 
engaged in diversion.116 
This Article 11 assessment, like Article 7’s required 
assessment of the risk that a transfer will contribute to serious 
violations of international law, denies exporting States the 
defense of we didn’t know what would happen because we didn’t ask. 
If conventional arms are wrongfully diverted, the exporting 
State can escape responsibility only by establishing that it 
assessed the risk of diversion yet determined the risk to be not 
overriding, despite the fact that the diversion actually happened. 
Moreover, as with the Article 7 assessment, UN officials, officials 
of other countries, law enforcers from every jurisdiction, and 
NGOs will likely proffer evidence on everything from border 
                                                                                                                                     
114. ATT, supra note 1, art. 11.2. 
115. Id. art. 11.3. 
116. Id. art. 11.5 
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and customs security to the risks of piracy. The assessment 
process, in and of itself, suggests better transparency and more 
informed decisions. Altogether, it is difficult for exporting States 
to ignore the risks of diversion, which makes it more difficult for 
arms criminals to take advantage of licit commercial avenues. 
There are, in addition, two ATT provisions that deserve 
comment in terms of their contribution to preventing 
conventional arms diversion: (1) regulation of conventional 
arms brokers and (2) legal cooperation and information sharing 
to prevent and eradicate diversion of conventional arms. 
A. Regulating Brokers 
ATT Article 10 requires each State Party to regulate 
brokering under its jurisdiction. “Brokers” who negotiate and 
make arrangements for arms transactions are crucial links in the 
increasingly globalized and differentiated conventional arms 
trade.117 They constitute the hematological system of the arms 
network, facilitating transport, logistics, warehousing, financing, 
insuring, and licensing of arms transfers. More simply, brokers 
find the arms, mediate the commercial transaction, obtain 
necessary legal and other documentation, and ensure delivery.118 
As long as weapons are needed for self-defense and 
maintenance of domestic order, weapons brokers will be 
essential elements in the supply chain. The problem is that some 
brokers devote their expertise to illicitly diverting conventional 
                                                                                                                                     
117. “Although there is not yet a universally agreed definition of the term ‘illicit 
arms brokering’, it usually refers in general to those acts of mediation to arrange arms 
transfers: (i) whose intended recipients are groups, individuals or states that are 
prohibited by national or international law from possessing or acquiring such arms—
for example, embargoed states, armed groups and criminal gangs, including those 
believed to engage in terrorist attacks; and (ii) where a broker carries out some other 
activity in contravention of the national law applicable where the broker operates, 
resides or holds nationality, for example failing to acquire prior authorization from the 
relevant state to conduct arms brokering within that jurisdiction. In addition, some 
activities of arms brokers may be criminal under more general laws—such as statutes 
that outlaw the transfer of arms without state approval, or bribery or money 
laundering, which are illegal in most if not all states.” U.N. Inst. Disarmament Res., 
Developing a Mechanism to Prevent Illicit Brokering in Small Arms and Light Weapons—Scope 
and Implications, U.N. Doc UNIDIR/2006/23 (2006) [hereinafter UNIDIR Report]. 
118 . Id. at 46; see also Katharine Orlovsky, Note, International Criminal Law: 
Towards New Solutions in the Fight Against Illegal Arms Brokers, 29 HASTINGS INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 343, 348 n.19 (2006). 
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arms, not only as venal conduits but also as stokers of conflict, 
repression, and crime whose actions have most grave 
consequences for humanity. 
In 1996, the UN International Commission of Inquiry on 
arms flows to the perpetuators of the Rwandan Genocide made 
the first reference to brokering activities. Brokers reappeared in 
subsequent UN investigations of the violation of arms 
embargoes against Angola, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia.119 In the UNPoA, 
discussed earlier, Member States agreed to develop national 
legislation or administrative practices regulating weapons 
brokers including the registration of brokers, licensing or 
authorization of brokering transactions, and penalties for illicit 
brokering activities performed within the state’s jurisdiction and 
control.120 The Firearms Protocol, also discussed earlier, urges 
States to consider brokers’ registration and authorization as well 
as disclosure of the identities of brokers who are involved in any 
arms import or export activity. 121  Various regional and 
multilateral organizations have established instruments for 
regulating brokers.122 
                                                                                                                                     
119 . UNIDIR Report, supra note 117, at xvi–xvii. In 2001, a Group of 
Governmental Experts (“GGE”) concluded that Member States need to establish 
national systems of control for brokering and related activities occurring within their 
territorial jurisdiction, in order to deal effectively with illicit or undesirable arms 
transfers. Id. at xvii. 
120. Small Arms Review Conference, supra note 19, part II, para. 14. 
121. Firearms Protocol, supra note 17, art. 15. 
122. In Europe, the European Union and the OSCE have set standards for the 
control of brokering of all conventional arms. Participating States in the Wassenaar 
Arrangement—including the leading conventional arms producing and exporting 
states—agreed in 2003 to a set of common Elements for Effective Legislation on Arms 
Brokering. Org. for Sec. & Co-operation in Eur., Summary Report on replies provided 
by participating States on the one-off information exchange with regard to OSCE 
Principles on the Control of Brokering in Small Arms and Light Weapons, 
FSC.GAL/95/11 (Sept. 1, 2011). The Organization of American States’ (“OAS”) Inter-
American Drug Abuse Control Commission (“CICAD”) agreed to the Model 
Regulations to Control Brokers of Small Arms. In Africa, the African Union is 
committed to controlling the brokering of small arms and light weapons, and three 
binding sub-regional agreements reinforce these commitments. In May 2002, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) agreed to preventing arms 
smuggling as part of transnational crime, and in 2004 the Asia–Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (“APEC”) agreed to ban the use of nongovernmental brokers and 
brokering services for transfers of manportable air-defense systems (“MANPADS”). The 
Asian and Middle East regions so far lack any agreed standards to control arms 
brokering.  
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The obligation to regulate brokers and their transactions is 
emerging as a principle of mutual interest among States in the 
international community. The obligation’s normative 
underpinnings for preventing conflict and crime are, by now, so 
widely accepted as to need little defense. Today’s reality is that 
illicit weapons brokers face an altogether more hostile legal 
environment than their predecessors did. Yesterday’s daring 
gunrunner is now and must be a criminal. More brokers have 
been prosecuted in the last decade than ever before, including 
Viktor Bout, arguably the most famous arms broker who will 
spend the rest of his life in prison. In much of the world, only 
legally accountable specialists and firms are allowed to broker 
conventional arms. 
The ATT’s reiteration of the obligation to regulate brokers 
should be seen as reinforcing the onus of State responsibility for 
not adequately regulating arms brokers. For it is where legal 
regulation of brokers is weakest that fires of violence rage most 
fiercely, fueled by the remaining criminal networks of arms 
transfers. The duty to regulate brokers has evolved over the 
course of a decade from a request to a mutual commitment to a 
reiterated obligation that is a pillar of international peace and 
security. The ATT suggests that humanity will not tolerate 
inaction in this context: States are responsible for regulating 
arms brokers in their jurisdiction and under their control, and 
international cooperation to fulfill that responsibility must be an 
important priority. 
B. Detecting and Stopping Arms Traffickers 
At the heart of stanching the illicit trade in conventional 
arms is enabling law enforcement to detect and prevent 
incidents of illicit trading as well as to investigate and arrest arms 
traffickers. Arms criminals operate through markets where their 
shipments can be kept secret and where law enforcement 
capabilities are weakest. For the most part, they buy, transport, 
and trans-ship arms through nations that are neither the 
producer nor ultimate user of the weapons. In arms markets 
where activities are segmented across people in multiple 
nations, each of whom has only scant responsibility for the 
criminal enterprise as a whole, dedication of law enforcement 
resources to stopping the enterprise can and often has been 
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seen as a low priority. As with so much of international crime 
today, the victims of illicit arms transfers are not represented in 
nations where dedication of law enforcement resources could 
actually stop illicit transfers. 
The problem can best be expressed in jurisdictional terms. 
Consider as a question of jurisdiction: stashes of arms in Country 
A are diverted by a trafficker who is a citizen of Country B, and 
are delivered through multiple trans-shipment points in 
Countries C, D, and E, to criminal recipients in Country F (in 
the midst of substantial strife) where militias or gangs of 
uncertain official status use them to kill innocent victims and 
where national law enforcement is essentially ineffective. Who 
has jurisdiction to investigate this network and execute arrests 
and prosecutions? If the trafficker is now in Country H, to which 
country should Country H be legally obligated to extradite the 
trafficker? The prohibitions of the ATT focus predominantly on 
requiring Country A to not authorize transfer of the arms, and 
Countries A and B should regulate the trafficker as a broker. But 
the important question remains how to arrest and prosecute 
traffickers, and to do that requires establishment of criminal 
jurisdiction. 
Consider that, in addition to killing citizens of Country F, 
the arms are used to kill citizens of Country G who were in 
Country F, perhaps as guests or perhaps executing bi- or 
multilateral law enforcement functions (e.g. fighting illicit drug 
or human trafficking). Of these countries, Country G has a legal 
interest (justice for its citizens-victims) in breaking up this 
criminal enterprise and prosecuting the trafficker. If Country G 
has criminalized diversion of weapons to groups or entities who 
use them to kill its citizens, then it could assert passive 
personality jurisdiction and, if circumstances warrant, protection 
of vital national interests.123 Country G could seek the trafficker’s 
                                                                                                                                     
123. For example, Viktor Bout was prosecuted in the United States under, inter 
alia, 18 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012) (providing protection to Officers and Employees of the 
United States), because he sold firearms with knowledge that the buyer’s purpose was 
to use them against persons working for the US government. United States v. Bout, 731 
F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2013) (affirming conviction). Other federal criminal statutes that 
small arms smugglers have been prosecuted under include § 2339A (providing material 
support or resources, including weapons, to those known to engage in or intending to 
engage in terrorism) and § 2339B (providing material support or resources, including 
weapons, to nationally designated foreign terrorist organizations). 
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extradition from Country H and could solicit evidence from all 
the mentioned countries to establish the trafficker’s criminal 
responsibility. 
This scenario greatly simplifies the prosecutions in US 
courts of conventional arms brokers such as Viktor Bout124 and 
Monzer Al Kassar.125  These prosecutions have depended on 
increasingly effective principles of legal assistance and 
cooperation. 126  Despite the success of these prosecutions, 
experts assert that substantial barriers to the effective 
investigation and prosecution of criminal diverters of 
conventional arms remain.127 
The ATT makes only two modest contributions to 
addressing these barriers. Article 11.4 prescribes that when a 
State Party detects a diversion of transferred conventional arms, 
it shall take “appropriate measures, pursuant to its national 
laws” to address that diversion. “Such measures may include 
alerting potentially affected States Parties, examining diverted 
shipments . . . and taking follow-up measures through 
investigation and law enforcement.” In terms of the above-
described situation, Countries C, D, and E may be obligated, if 
any of them detect diverted conventional arms, to alert other 
States or to engage law enforcement. 
                                                                                                                                     
124. Bout, 731 F.3d at 233. 
125. United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2011). 
126 . See United States v. Naidu, 465 Fed. App’x. 264, 266 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(convicting Naidu for conspiracy to provide material support, including illicit firearms 
for terrorist organizations); United States v. Aguilda-Urbay, 480 Fed. App’x. 564, 574 
(11th Cir. 2012) (convicting Urbay, a Cuban national, and his co-conspirator Abdal 
Aziz Hamayel of conspiracy to receive and possess stolen firearms); see also Colby 
Goodman & Scott Stedjan, Beyond Viktor Bout: Why the United States Needs an Arms Trade 
Treaty (Oxfam Briefing Paper No. 156, Oct. 6, 2011) (“The US has worked on at least 
70 US prosecutions in the last five years that have charged defendants with crimes 
related to illegal arms brokering.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: MAJOR U.S. 
EXPORT ENFORCEMENT PROSECUTIONS DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS (Oct. 20, 2008), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/October/08-nsd-959.html (listing 
fifteen successful prosecutions against illicit trafficking in firearms, munitions and 
related articles from 10/06—10/08). 
127. For a fuller discussion of the current limitations of international criminal law 
enforcement in this domain, see CUKIER, supra note 103; James G. Stewart, Atrocity, 
Commerce and Accountability, 8 J. INT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE 314 (2010); Katharine 
Orlovsky, International Criminal Law: Towards New Solutions in the Fight Against Illegal 
Arms Brokers, 29 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 343 (2006); SARAH PARKER, 
IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROGRAMME OF ACTION ON SMALL ARMS, 
IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES (2011). 
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It is important to briefly mention what is not required by 
Article 11.4. There is no obligation whatsoever to detect diverted 
arms or even to strengthen detection capabilities. There is no 
obligation to check transited or trans-shipped arms against 
national or international records to find out if they have been 
diverted. The premise of Article 11.4 is the odd chance of 
coming across diverted arms. Once those arms are detected, 
there is no obligation to trace them to their source or to where 
they might have been diverted from or by whom. There is not an 
obligation to destroy the arms or even to stop them from 
reaching a criminal recipient. 
As discussed below, each State Party must maintain national 
records of its exported conventional arms and should maintain 
records of transited or trans-shipped arms, yet there is no 
Article 11 requirement that States which have detected diverted 
conventional arms check them against the records of other 
States Parties. There is no obligation whatsoever to engage 
Interpol or other transnational law enforcement organizations, 
although a State is certainly welcome to do so (and may be 
bound to do so by other commitments). Article 11 contains no 
obligation to inform the ATT Secretariat of the detected 
diverted arms. 
The second ATT provision that is relevant to stopping 
criminal arms transfers is Article 15.4, which encourages States 
to share “information regarding illicit activities and actors and 
[sic] in order to prevent and eradicate diversion of conventional 
arms.” More directly, Article 15.5 requires States to afford one 
another the “widest measure of assistance in investigations, 
prosecutions and judicial proceedings in relation to violations of 
national measures established pursuant to this Treaty.”128 While 
Article 15’s sweepingly general provisions could justify virtually 
any positive action that a State chooses to undertake against 
diversion, there are no specific obligations to do much of 
anything. Most important, the ATT omits a prosecute or extradite 
obligation, and it does not obligate sharing of records or other 
types of evidence. The broad language of Article 15 is, at best, a 
marker for yet-to-be-negotiated international legal assistance 
obligations that can tackle the illicit arms trade more rigorously. 
                                                                                                                                     
128. ATT, supra note 1, art. 15.4–.5. 
726 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:687 
Worth noting in this context are the ATT draft provisions 
for strengthening enforcement that were removed from the 
final text. States would have been required to: 
 Adopt measures to provide for the investigation and 
prosecution of those violating the Treaty; 
 Take all necessary measures to prevent, counter, and 
prosecute corruption, as well as money laundering, by 
those within its territories or by its nationals; 
 Adopt legislation or other appropriate measures to 
ensure the ability to enforce the obligations of the treaty 
and to prohibit the transfer of arms from any location 
under that State’s jurisdiction and control unless 
authorized in accordance with the Treaty;129 and 
 Require an end-use certificate that provides 
assurance of the end-user’s use of the arms issued by 
competent national authorities and bearing a unique 
serial number so that authenticity of the certificate is 
easily checked.130 
The principal objection to these provisions, led by the 
United States, was that the ATT should not spell out all the 
details of national implementation which should be left to each 
State. “[T]he Conference must be unequivocal in making 
enforcement of the Treaty’s provisions a national, rather than 
international or multilateral, responsibility of each State 
Party.”131 As a consequence, the ATT’s contributions to stopping 
arms criminals are modest at best. States that currently have 
weak and ineffective measures are under no obligation to 
improve their current system. This represents a large loophole 
as States have no obligation to criminalize or punish violations 
of the Treaty if their current system has no laws or regulations 
pertaining to the obligations of the Treaty. 
                                                                                                                                     
129. Chairman’s Draft Paper 2011, supra note 42, art. 6(C). Most references to the 
enforcement section in the Chairman’s Paper are actually in support of the detailed 
enforcement mechanisms/requirements. In particular, the United Kingdom, Costa 
Rica, and Kenya were strong advocates of including enforcement requirements. 
130. National Implementation of the proposed Arms Trade Treaty: A Practical Guide, 
OXFAM (2010), http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/English_PATT_full_
web.pdf . 
131. ATT Thematic Statement, UN FIRST COMM. (2011), http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/194103.pdf 
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The key question, looking forward, is whether there 
continue to be active arms criminals who escape prosecution. If 
so, then it may be worth considering a more mandated set of 
legal obligations with regard to legal assistance and cooperation 
in this context. 
IV. CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFER CONTROL SYSTEM 
The least substantial aspect of the ATT is its contribution to 
developing national systems for controlling who has transferred 
conventional arms or may do so. Indeed, the ATT evinces a 
commitment to not intrude into sensitive matters concerning 
domestic control of conventional arms and how the 
international community should monitor nations’ control 
systems. In terms of mandating official responsibilities to control 
arms, at either the national or the international level, the ATT 
falls far short of other arms control treaties such as the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty or the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
A. National Control Systems 
Little detail is given to the Article 5.2 requirement that 
States establish a “national control system, including a national 
control list.” This requirement offers no metrics such that it 
might be possible to say that a particular State’s control system 
satisfies an international standard. These are broad terms of art, 
establishing a requirement that each State undertake a self-
assessment of what its national authorities currently regulate, 
whether for export or domestic transfer, and how its regulatory 
system operates. The objective here is to clarify who are the 
officials obligated to carry out the treaty’s provisions. With this 
clarification, the international community can better appreciate 
national authorities’ capacities, and all complying States can 
gain confidence of a mutual commitment to comply with the 
treaty. 
Many nations advocated that there is no one-size-fits-all 
approach to national control systems. Countries vary greatly with 
regard to the amount of arms transfers that occur under their 
jurisdiction; some may need expansive systems while others may 
only need a minimal system. Moreover, there is the vast 
discrepancy in national wealth and thus ability to implement 
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comprehensive systems. Notably, the final Treaty does include 
the suggestion that States implement an import control system 
to regulate imports of conventional arms into their 
jurisdiction. 132  Yet, States have unfettered discretion to 
implement a system of their choice, even a system that is entirely 
superficial. 
These factors have led to the final text with its open-ended 
description of national control systems as this allows States to 
tailor their systems to their needs.133 Article 5.3 encourages 
States to apply treaty provisions broadly, referring at minimum 
to descriptions of weapons categories used in the UN Register of 
Conventional Arms. Yet, provisions that would have required 
regulatory oversight over conventional arms leases,134 loans,135 
and gifts136 were removed from the final text. This allows for 
unregulated leases with upfront expensive payments to be 
enacted as an alternative to sale. It would be exceedingly 
difficult to determine whether the lessor actually expects the 
arms returned and therefore it would be just as difficult to 
determine whether this type of transaction is a lease or merely a 
sale labeled a lease. Similarly removed was any oversight of arms 
research and development137 and to raising or providing funds 
to enable a transfer of conventional arms.138 
Article 5.5 and 5.6 requires establishment of “competent 
national authorities” and national points of contact that provide 
an official and easy-to-access route for all national authorities to 
give and receive information. Officials responsible for carrying 
out various implementation activities of the treaty must ensure 
that information is accurately exchanged through methods 
designed by Interpol and other organizations. The ATT 
Secretariat will maintain and make available the list of national 
points of contact and will facilitate matching offers and requests 
for assistance and international cooperation. Building 
                                                                                                                                     
132. ATT, supra note 1, art. 8. 
133. See Compilation of Views, supra note 46. 
134. Chair of the Preparatory Committee of the Conference on the Arms Trade 
Treaty, Chairman’s Draft Proposal, Annex B(k) (Feb. 16, 2011) (by Roberto Garcia 
Moritán). 
135. Id. annex B(l). 
136. Id. annex B(m). 
137. Id. annex B(o). 
138. Id. annex B(p). 
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confidence and cooperation among States in this way serves to 
strengthen law enforcement capacities to tackle illicit arms 
trafficking.  
All this to the ATT’s credit, yet a moment’s consideration 
should be given to what was omitted from the final text. Earlier 
drafts specified responsibilities for national coordination 
agencies, including policy guidance, coordination of law 
enforcement and other authorities, research and monitoring of 
efforts to stanch illicit transfers, and identification of criminal 
networks. Mandating such responsibilities would encourage 
dedication of resources to fulfilling the aims of the Treaty. The 
varying needs of different States, however, led to the omission of 
these requirements. Other measures would have ensured that 
each State has a sufficient number of properly trained staff to 
ensure that the measures required by the Treaty are 
implemented successfully. Some States argued that the Treaty 
should have included aid arrangements that would enable less 
developed States to receive assistance for training their officials. 
The ATT leaves all these matters for future consideration. 
B. Recordkeeping and Information Sharing 
Promoting information recording and sharing is one of the 
ATT’s most essential objectives. Accordingly, national 
authorities should maintain records of export authorizations 
that include details of types of weapons being shipped, their 
destination, method of shipment, and, in some cases, why are 
they being shipped. Such information can also include the 
containment methods for the weapons and the security 
standards. 139  Each State Party is encouraged to maintain 
comparable information on arms transferred to its territory for 
import, transit, or trans-shipment. 
This information, together with records urged by the 
Firearms Protocol about the weapons’ manufacturers,140 assists 
in providing transparency of weapons shipments and can help in 
                                                                                                                                     
139. See Safeworld, An Implementation Framework for the Arms Trade Treaty 
(July 2011), http://controlarms.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/An-
Implementation-Framework-for-the-ATT.pdf; Oxfam, National Implementation of the 
Proposed Arms Trade Treaty: A Practical Guide (July 14, 2010), http://www.oxfam.org/
sites/www.oxfam.org/files/English_PATT_full_web.pdf. 
140. Firearms Protocol, supra note 17, art. 15. 
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tracing such weapons if they have been diverted. Dates and 
details of weapons types can also help identify where weapons 
diversions occur. For example, if a participant in transnational 
organized crime is known to use certain types of weapons, 
sharing such information can help identify weapons trafficking 
routes to ultimately clarify how criminals are acquiring weapons.  
Article 13 requires each State Party to report to the 
Secretariat on measures undertaken to implement the treaty; 
these Reports will be distributed to all States Parties. Each State 
Party must also submit annual reports concerning authorized or 
actual conventional arms exports and imports. Reports “may 
contain the same information submitted by the State Party to 
relevant UN frameworks, including the UN Register of 
Conventional Arms. Reports may exclude commercially sensitive 
or national security information.”141 
CONCLUSION 
The ATT is a political compromise—the common 
denominator of global opinion about how to stanch the illicit 
arms trade. Advocates must be simultaneously disappointed by 
concessions left behind and exhilarated by opportunities to 
stanch the previously anarchic circulation of humanity’s most 
lethal weapons. “[T]his Treaty sets a floor—not a ceiling . . . .”142 
No one can reasonably believe that the world’s raging violence 
will sputter and subside merely because of the UN General 
Assembly’s approval of treaty text. If that were true, war would 
have ended in 1928 when the League of Nations approved the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact. 
What may be said with confidence is that the ATT builds 
upon a foundation of hard treaties, soft international guidelines, 
and webs of inter-operative commitments that are enhancing 
law’s incremental victory over weaponized violence. Its success 
depends on the assiduous work of the United Nations, a host of 
international and regional organizations and NGOs to establish, 
                                                                                                                                     
141. ATT, supra note 1, art. 13.3 
142. See Rosemary A. DiCarlo, U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to the 
United Nations, Statement to the United Nations at the UN General Assembly Meeting 
on the Arms Trade Treaty (Apr. 2, 2013), available at http://usun.state.gov/briefing/
statements/207006.htm. 
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under the ATT’s imprimatur, legal capacities for ensuring that 
only peaceful and lawfully authorized people have conventional 
arms. The Secretariat should act as a catalyst for making the 
ATT effective, but whether the Secretariat emerges as a hub of 
information that can stanch the illicit weapons trade or is merely 
a distributor of unread reports remains to be seen. As 
mentioned earlier, much of the ATT’s success depends on how 
rigorously the Secretariat enables gathering and sharing of 
information that helps disable criminal arms traffickers. 
The ATT’s impact depends, ultimately, on whether its 
obligations are implemented in harmony with many other 
policies for reducing conflict. If the quantity and voracity of 
violence involving conventional arms declines, then the abstract 
legal questions about the ATT’s terms and requirements can be 
left for scholars.  To control conventional weapons will require 
more work and more legal measures, but the ATT is an 
important contribution to international law’s pursuit of the 
eradication of violence and preservation of peace. 
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